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Summary findings
In most countries, the state owns the water and hydraulic  changes in water allocation in response to changing
infrastructure, and public officials decide who gets water  demand for water and can stimulate investment and
rights, how the water is to be used, and how much will  employment as investors are assured of access to water.
be charged for its use. But there is ample evidence that  Moreover, agricultural production will become more
water allocation by administrative edict has resulted in  economically efficient as output will reflect the true
costly, large-scale inefficiencies in the supply and use of  scarcity of water rather  than the frequently distorted
water. Secure property rights have been shown to have a  prices set by administrators subject to political lobbying.
powerful positive effect on investment and efficiency, but  Because of water's unique characteristics, an effective
only a few countries have tried to introduce tradable  tradable water  rights system is not easy to introduce and
property rights to water, thereby taking advantage of the  water markets are not a panacea. But these same
allocative efficiencies of a market to assign water  characteristics make administrative solutions to water
resources among users.  allocation difficult - water markets rarely make them
Holden and Thobani  compare administered systems of  worse. Chile's experience and the demonstrated
water allocation with a system of tradable water rights.  superiority of markets over administrative means of
Using an approach derived from the literature on  resource allocation suggest that water markets are likely
property rights and new institutional economics, they  to be a better alternative in most water-scarce countries.
argue that even with an adequate institutional  To ensure an effective water market, attention  should
framework, administrative methods of allocating water  be paid to:
result in inefficient outcomes. Water is used wastefully.  - Ensuring stakeholder participation in designing and
Public hydraulic projects are poorly conceived,  implementing the new legislation.
implemented, and operated. And the'systems have failed  *  Deciding rules for the initial allocation of rights and
to protect the environment or make water accessible to  on how new rights would be allocated.
the poor. As urbanization spreads and pressures on the  * Establishing a public registry and block titling.
water supply get worse, such solutions are likely to  * Setting up or strengthening water user associations.
become even more untenable.  * Protecting against the development of potential
Chile's experience in water-scarce areas demonstrates  monopolies.
that tradable water rights can benefit the poor and  *  Ensuring that trades do not infringe on the water
increase user participation on water allocation and  rights of existing users.
investment decisions. They can allow rapid voluntary  * Establishing appropriate environmental  laws.
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1.  Water, which  in many  cultures has an almost mystical significance,  has often been
the cause of disputes  both between  individuals and countries. Conflicts  have  on occasion
escalated  into violence  and in the case of countries, wars. The aggression  that such disputes
has provoked rests on the life-giving  and agricultural characteristics  of water. The fact that it
is essential  has frequently  been  used to justify heavy state intervention  in the granting and
administration  of rights to the use of water. In most countries, the state  owns  the water and
hydraulic infrastructure  and public officials decide on who gets water rights, on the purpose
for which  the water is to be used, and on the price to be charged for its use. However, there
is ample  evidence  that water allocation  by administrative  edict has resulted  in large scale
costly inefficiencies  in the supply  of water and in its use. Although  there is substantial
documentation  that secure  property rights have a powerful positive  effect  investmnent  and
efficiency  (see, for example,  Demsetz 1967, Alchian and Demsetz  1972,  and Barzel 1989),
only a few countries  have  tried to introduce tradable property rights to water, thereby taking
advantage  of the allocative  efficiencies  of a market to assign water  resources  among  users.
2.  The paper compares  administered  systems of water allocation  with a system of
tradable water rights. Using  an approach derived from the property rights  and new
institutional  economics  literature  the paper argues that even with an adequate  institutional
framework, administrative  methods  of allocating water result in inefficient  outcomes.
However, tradable  water rights  combined with effective institutions  solve  many of the
problems  that administered  solutions  fail to deal with.
3.  After describing  how  water rights are defined, assigned, and enforced  under
conventional  water rights  regimes,  the paper reviews the experience  of such  regimes and
evaluates  on-going  measures  to improve water management.  Next, the paper focuses on
tradable water rights, giving  their characteristics and showing  them to be a form of property
right. It then discusses  why  and how some countries are promoting  tradable  water rights
regimes and discusses  their  experience and potential. Finally, the paper reviews  conceptual
and practical problems  in establishing  tradable water rights and suggests  how to design and
implement  a system of tradable  water rights in order to resolve  these  problems.
Conventional  Water  Rights  Regimes
4.  In most countries  where water is scarce or costly to access, systems  of rights for
water use have  evolved  implicitly  through custom or explicitly  though  bodies  of law and
regulations  (or both). These  water rights specify how water in a river is to be divided
between alternative  uses such  as industrial use, domestic water supply  and agriculture,  as
well as between individual  water users within a sector. Water rights are generally  based on a2
variant or combination  of the following  three systems: riparian rights, prior (appropriative)
rights, and public allocation  (Sampath  1992).
How  Water Rights are Defined, Assigned and Enforced
5.  Under the riparian  rights doctrine, anyone who possesses land next to a flowing
river or stream may take its water as long as enough is left for downstream  users.
Diversions of water to locations  not adjoining the river or stream are prohibited.  Such
systems  tend to occur in areas where water is relatively abundant  and where strict definition
of rights is not crucial (France, eastern part of the United States). In addition,  even where
surface water rights are determined  by other means, countries typically  allow ground  water
rights to accrue to those that own the land overlying the aquifer.
6.  Prior rights are based  on the appropriation  doctrine, under which the water right is
acquired by actual use over time. Diversions of water are permitted and quotas  are allocated
to specified  parties on a first-come,  first-served basis and are subject to the "use it or lose
it" rule. This is the main system  prevailing in the arid western  part of the United  States-
those that established  a beneficial  use early were given senior rights (early settlers  and
farmers) over those that established  them later (cities).
7.  Public allocation  involves  publicly administered  distribution of water. Under  this
system, public authorities  decide how to allocate water using guidelines  or laws  establishing
priorities and often specify  the uses to which the water can be put. Most developing
countries follow variants of this approach. Although there is often a charge for water  use
(usually  based on size of the irrigated area), the water rights themselves  are obtained  without
charge, with irrigation rights linked  to land.
8.  Water rights are typically  defined in one of several ways: volumetrically  as a share
of the stream or canal flow or of the water available in a reservoir or lake; or in terms of
shifts or hours of availability  at a certain intake. In some cases, the water rights may  be
defined as a combination  of the above or be conditional  upon water availability.  For
instance, water going into a canal  may be based on a share of the river flow whereas  water
going to individual  farmers  may be based on hours of water available  at an intake  point.
Some rights are volumetric  only if there is a certain level of water in the river; otherwise,
they are proportional.  Similarly,  rights may be defined as a share of the excess  water flow
above a given stream flow (defined  in liters/second) or above a certain level of water  in a
lake or reservoir (defined  in cubic meters). Certain junior rights under an appropriative
rights regime may be exercised  only if senior rights have been met. Rights  may  be
consumptive  or non-consumptive:  while consumptive  rights have no obligation  to return any
quantity  of water to a river, non-consumptive  rights may face an obligation  to return the
same quantity  and quality of water to a specified  location. Generally, only hydropower
companies  have such rights. Worldwide, 69 percent of water is used in agriculture,  23
percent in industry, and only 8 percent for domestic purposes.3
9.  The measurement infrastructure varies from simple dividers within a stream or canal
that divert water according to established  ratios to measuring devices that may continuously
record volumetric water flow and transmit  the information instantly to computers at a central
monitoring station. The operation and maintenance of the water distribution system and the
enforcement of water rights is increasingly done by water user associations and communities
rather than public authorities. Similar,  in cases of dispute, the water user association is
typically the first arbiter.
Experience  with Administrative Methods  of  Water Allocation
10.  The track record of such administered systems of water allocation has not been
impressive. Despite growing water scarcity and the high costs of hydraulic infrastructure,
water is typically underpriced and used wastefully, the infrastructure is frequently poorly
conceived, built, and operated, and delivery is often unreliable. At the same time, there are
high fiscal costs stemming from the construction of hydraulic infrastructure; from the
institutional bureaucracy to support the design and execution of the projects and to set and
collect water tariffs; and from the cost of operating and maintaining the system. Many large
multipurpose hydraulic projects (irrigation, hydropower, flood control, urban use, etc.) were
undertaken on political rather than economic grounds (see Box 1). Costs tend to be high
Box 1.  Public Hydraulic Projects
Governments  from both developed  and developing  countries  have invested  heavily in
public  hydraulic  projects.  However,  the results have often  been  well below  expectations.  For
example,  by the end of 1993,  the Government  of Peru had spent $3.4 billion (in constant  1993
dollars)  on nine coastal  multipurpose  projects. Although some of these projects  had been  in
execution  for over two decades,  they had realized only 6.6 percent of their planned  expansion  in
irrigation  and none of their planned  hydropower  generation  capacity.  While  the primary
justification  of these projects  was irrigation,  the estimated  cost per hectare  of these schemes  at
completion  ranged  from $10,000  to $56,000, even while irrigated  land in these areas  sells for
about $3,000  (see World  Bank 1995).
Water  resources  development  in Asian countries  typically  accounts  for 20 to 25 percent
of total public  investment.  However,  in Sri Lanka,  the Mahaweli  Development  Program  alone,  at
its peak,  absorbed  6 percent  of GDP and 44 percent of public investment  expenditure!  The costs
of land  development,  excluding  headworks,  were $12,000-$15,000  per hectare  at 1987  prices,
compared  to $3,000-$5,000  in other  Asian countries.  Even  with a double  cropped  paddy,  the
economic  returns  from the earlier,  and cheaper, projects  were found  to be low  or negative.  Since
not even O&M  costs could subsequently  be recovered,  new settlers  benefited  from massive
subsidies  and their spatial  distribution,  if anything,  aggravated  social  tensions (see Frederiksen,
Berkoff,  and Barber  1993).  Similarly,  the performance  of Pakistan's 13,000  public  tubewells  has
been poor. Despite  these  tubewells  receiving 55 percent of total O&M expenditures  even  though
they account  for only 10 percent  of irrigation  water supplies,  their pumping  capacity  declined  an
average  of 4-6 percent  annually,  with 20 to 45 percent of public  tubewells  not operating  at any
one time as compared  to 10  percent of private tubewells  (see World  Bank 1993).4
because of: inappropriate  design,  stemming  in part from poor studies  done prior to start-up;
long gestation  periods  resulting  from funding shortfalls  due to changing  government  priorities
and poor capital  programming  and budgeting;  few managerial  incentives  to control  costs;  and
reported corruption  that typically  involves  kickbacks from construction  companies.
11.  In many countries,  for cultural,  political or religious  reasons,  water  use is not priced  at
all, so there is little incentive  to conserve.  When it exists, water charges,  are weUl  below  the
cost of developing  water  resources.  Therefore, it is not unusual  to find cities  in arid areas
rationing  water and foregoing  potentially  lucrative activities  while  neighboring  farmers  grow
low-value  water-intensive  crops  such  as rice and alfalfa  using inefficient  irrigation  technologies.
12.  Moreover, government  control of water has favored the relatively  wealthy  and has
not been effective  at ensuring  access of the poor to water. In many cities in developing
countries it is the poor that are excluded  from piped municipal  water and must resort  to very
expensive private water truckers  to meet their daily needs. A review of water vending  in
sixteen cities (World  Bank 1992)  shows  that the unit cost of vended  water is 4 to 100  times
higher than water from piped city supplies (the median cost was 12 times higher).  Similarly,
influential  farmers manage  to get easier access to water rights, which are obtained  without
charge, often at the expense  of reducing  availability for the poor, and for whose  use farmers
pay only a nominal  charge.
13.  Although  public  control  over water is thought necessary  to address  environmental
problems, governments  usually  fail to maintain water or soil quality. Unsafe  water causes
water borne diseases  that result in the deaths of 3 million  people annually  and render sick
more than a billion more. The discharge  of untreated industrial waste, the runoff  of
agricultural chemicals,  and poor land use practices in agriculture,  forestry, and mining
causes widespread  degradation  of land and water resources (World  Bank 1993).  Water
logging and salinization  have  destroyed  millions of hectares of fertile agricultural  soils. In
Pakistan, extensive  water logging  and secondary soil salinization  has resulted  in an estimated
10 percent of its irrigation  system  covering some 13.5 million  hectares  to be affected  by
salinity (Frederiksen,  Berkoff,  and Barber 1993). Sometimes  public irrigation  projects
themselves  lead to salinization.  Until the 1960s, the Aral Sea in Russia  was environmentally
stable with a thriving  commercial  fishery. The massive diversion  of the two largest  rivers in
Central Asia to expand  irrigated  cotton  production eventually  dried up the rivers  and shrank
the lake by 66 percent. Salinity  increased, soils became waterlogged,  fish spawning  grounds
dried up, and the fishery  collapsed.  An ecological catastrophe  developed  as winds  picked up
salt and pesticides  from the dry lake bed, caused salt and pesticide storms, and ruined the
productivity  of farmland  over a wide area (World Bank 1993).
Measures  to Resolve Water Shortages and Improve  Water Use
14.  In attempting  to address  the problems  described above, there is increased  attention
being paid to management  reforms  such as though better planning  and changes  in bureaucratic
structure  and pricing  policy.  This approach  is perhaps best reflected  in a recent  policy  paper5
(World Bank  1993)  which  takes  the view that because of imperfections  in water  markets,  they
should  be eschewed  in favor  of comprehensive  administered  solutions.  "At the  heart of the
approach  is the development  of a comprehensive  analytical  framework  for water  resources
management.  Water  resources  should  be managed in the context of a national  water  strategy
that reflects  the nation's social,  economic,  and environmental  objectives  and is based  on an
assessment  of the country's  water  resources. The assessment  would include  a realistic  forecast
of the demand  for water, based  on the projected  population  growth and economic  development
and a consideration  of the options  for managing  demand and supply,  taking  into account
existing  investments  and those  likely  to occur in the private sector" (World  Bank  1993,  p. 41).
Proponents  of such solutions  claim  that national  plans such as the one described  above  will
solve problems  of allocation  and  prioritization  and will allow long term investmnents  to be
made which  will ensure  that the demand  and supply of water will remain  in equilibrium.
15.  Essential  to the effective  implementation  of this form of solution  is that  users  be
charged the opportunity  cost of water which "provides a measure of the scarcity  value  of water
to society, thus highlighting  any cross-sectoral  differences  in value, taking  into  account
society's multiple  objectives  and water's multiple uses and interdependencies,"  (World  Bank
1993, p. 43). Not only would  it be difficult  to estimate such prices across  uses,  regions  and
over time, it may  be politically  difficult  to raise water charges to levels  that  reflect  the scarcity
value of water. Presently,  water charges  barely cover the cost of operating  and  maintaining  the
water delivery  system,  let alone  the cost of building the infrastructure.  Moreover,  for
irrigation  water at least, a sharp increase  in water charges would  imply an expropriation  of
property rights since land  prices  already reflect the access to cheap water.
16.  In evaluating  the efficacy  of such approaches to the allocation  of water  resources  and
in comparing  them to a tradable  water rights system, care must be taken to ensure  that the
same things are being compared.  The usual approach of strong advocates  of administered
solutions is to point out the existing  market imperfections, which reduce  the efficiency  or
effectiveness  of water markets,  and then to compare this situation  with an administrative
solution  which involves  a far-seeing,  incorruptible, influence-free  administrative  body that is
able to estimate alternative  rates of return between water investments  and investments  in
other parts of the economy  and then be able to design and implement  the correct  policy. In
reality, administrative  bodies  are often captured by interest groups, are not known  for being
far-sighted, are unable  to estimate  future demands with any accuracy,  are unable  to set and
collect appropriate  water charges, and almost always have more imperfections  than  the
markets that they are supposed  to replace.
17.  A further  drawback  of the administrative  approach is that it tends  to favor  large scale
investments  over water conservation;  there are few rewards for administrators  from
painstaking  improvements  in water efficiencies  via better pricing policies.  Rather  the
glamour of large projects and the attendant  publicity and power that they  bring  provide  far
stronger incentives.  In contrast,  attempts to set prices that reflect the true cost of water
provision are unpopular.  Without  such prices, incentive for users to conserve  water are
weaker.6
18.  In conclusion,  while the integrated water resources  management  approach  has worthy
goals, finding  incorruptible  and competent administrative  bodies that are able to accurately
estimate water demand  and supply over time and then design  and implement  investments  and
pricing policies  effectively  will be very difficult, especially  in developing  countries.  Despite
market imperfections,  an alternative  approach using a system  of secure and tradable  water
rights is worth serious  consideration.
Tradable  Water  Rights  Regimes
Characteristics
19.  Formal  Markets:  The key characteristics  of formal  secure  tradable  water  rights is that
the rights are independent  of land  and can be traded separately  from land within  a legal and
institutional  framework.  As such they are property rights  to water (Box  2). Ideally,  the water
rights should  be sold at freely negotiated  prices to anyone  for any purpose.  However,
sometimes  countries  impose  restrictions  such as requiring  the buyer to use it for some
beneficial  purpose  or that  they only be sold to a public  agency  at an administratively  set price,
thereby weakening  the property  right associated  with the water right (see the example  below
from the western  United  States).  There may also be other restrictions  relating  to water  quality,
to ensuring  that a certain  minimum  flow in a stream or river is maintained  for environmental
or recreational  reasons  and to protecting  the water rights  of third  parties.'
20.  Informal  markets,  whereby  individuals  or groups  of water rights holders  sell water to
other users at freely  negotiated  prices, have evolved spontaneously  in many countries  as a
response  to the failure  of public  allocation  of water. A 1990  survey  of surface  water  systems  in
Pakistan  (Pakistan  Water  and Power Development  Authority  1990)  found  active  water trading
for irrigation  water  in 70 percent  of the watercourses  studied.  In India, an estirated one-half
of the area irrigated  by tubewells  belongs to farmers who  buy water (Shah 1991).  While such
markets  help resolve  water  shortages,  the fact they are not supported  by existing  laws  limit
such transactions  to spot sales  of water or to the sale (lease)  of water for a single  year rather
than to permanent  sales of water rights. The difficulty  in enforcing  such  contracts  has also
tended  to confine  the transactions  to those within the same  sector, often  between  neighboring
farmers. The lack  of long-term  secure access to water under such a system  also  discourages
investment  in activities  that require access to large quantities  of water. Thus such  informal
water markets  can realize  only part of the potential  gains from trade and do not strictly  fit the
mold of tradable  water  rights  regimes  that are analyzed  in this paper.
I.  One of main sources of hydrological third-party effects stems from "return flows", which is the water
returned to the ground after use (e.g., the irrigation water that was not fully absorbed by the crop), and which
may infiltrate down to an aquifer that joins  a water source. If another user has rights to this water and if the
upstream user were to sell all the water he received to someone whose return flow was different, the rights of
the downstream user would be diminished.7
Box 2.  What Are Property Rights and Why Are They Important?
A property  right  over an asset consists of the right  to consume,  earn income  from  or sell the
asset.  The process  of establishing  property  rights involves  enshrining  legal  ownership.  Property
rights  encompass  both  physical  rights  which allow owners  to have  possession  of assets  that they
own  as well  as legal  rights  which  allow effective  recourse  to the legal  system  if the  physical  rights
are violated.  Formal  methods  of establishing  property  rights are  found  in that part  of the legal
system  which  determines  how  property  can be defined  and exchanged.  Normally  there  needs  to be
an efficient  process  for registering  property  rights which includes  ensuring  that nobody  else has
prior claims.  Legal  enforcement  mechanism  are important  in dealing  with  rights  that may  have
been  violated.  However,  the  strength  of ownership  is often  diluted  by constraints  arising  from  the
nature  of the  asset or from  the state  which might place restrictions  upon  its use.  In addition,  if the
costs of enforcing  rights  are  high because  of inadequate  provision  of such  public  goods  as policing
and the legal  system,  the strength  of property  rights will be weakened.
A key concept  that affects  the strength  of property  rights is that of transactions  costs,  which
are the costs  of defining,  protecting  and exchanging  property  rights.  The  effects  of high transactions
cost on property  rights  and exchange  have only recently  been  recognized  fully  (see Holden  and
Rajapatirana  1995).  Trades  which  would increase  welfare  may  not occur  if the  process  of  trading is
costly  or if rights  that  are  traded  cannot be protected.  Therefore,  institutions  that lower  transactions
costs are often  necessary  to help in the efficient functioning  of markets  and the market  for water  is
no exception.  Once rights  are defined and can be traded and transactions  costs  are low, assets will
be employed  in the most efficient  manner. In this way societal  welfare  will be maximized.
Countries Promoting Tradable Water Rights
21.  To allow water users to secure water on a permanent basis as well as to facilitate
water leasing, some countries have begun to pass legislation to permit secure and well-
defined tradable water rights. Chile's  1981 Water  Code established tradable water rights in
order to strengthen property rights,  allow flexibility  in water use, and empower water users
by requiring their consent to any reallocation  of water. Under this law, the State grants
existing water users (farmers, industrial  furms, water and power utilities) property rights to
both surface and ground water without charge.  New and/or unallocated water rights are
auctioned. The water rights are separate from  land and their private property status is based
on the property laws of the Civil Code.  Except  for a few restrictions, they can be transferred
or sold to anyone for any purpose at freely negotiated prices. As with land, market forces
determine the allocation and use of water,  once assigned.
22.  Water rights are acquired by being recorded  in a public registry as either
consumptive or non-consumptive, temporary  or permanent. Permanent consumptive rights
are defined in volumetric terms unless there is insufficient water to satisfy all water rights
holders,  in which case the water is distributed  proportionately.  Temporary (contingent)8
consumptive  rights, which are particularly  useful when there is storage availability,  can only
be honored  if all permanent  consumptive  rights have been met. Non-consumptive  rights,
used for hydropower  generation,  grant the owner the use of water as long as it is returned  to
its source at a specified  location  and quality. The bulk of the estimated  300,000  owners  of
water rights hold consumptive  rights, with agriculture accounting  for 89 percent  of such
rights (Rios and Quiroz 1995).  The monitoring, distribution, and enforcement  of water
rights is carried out by water  user associations  at the level of the river basin,  underground
aquifer (for groundwater),  primary  canal, and secondary  or tertiary canal. Except  for a few
large dams and their associated  main canals, all hydraulic infrastructure  is owned  and
operated  by water users themselves.
23.  Chile's experience  with water  markets  has been very positive.  Water  users  are
particularly  pleased  by the flexibility  and control over their water rights. In the arid areas  north
of Santiago,  there have been  many  mutually beneficial sales and leases of water, resulting  in
a voluntary  transfer of water to more productive  uses (see following  subsection).  However,
in the high-rainfall  areas south of Santiago,  there have been few trades since  the transactions
cost of registering  the rights and conveying  the water is greater than the gains  from
transferring  the water. There are also few transactions  in the main canal of the Maipo  river
near Santiago  because this canal  uses fixed flow dividers and the cost of changing  the water
intakes for transfers is prohibitive.
24.  For reasons largely unrelated  to water markets, Chile still has problems  in water use.
For example, Chile continues  to suffer from water quality problems since regulations  to its
tough 1990 environmental  law were never issued. Also, because the obligations  of non-
consumptive  rights holders to release  water for consumptive  purposes at certain  times  were
not clearly defined, conflicts  between  the recently privatized hydropower  companies  and
farmers have developed  in some  areas. Some shortcomings in the law have also  enabled  one
hydropower  company  to obtain huge volumes of non-consumptive  rights without  charge.
Despite these problems, Chile has far fewer conflicts  and makes better use of its water as
compared to its neighbors.
25.  Mexico. As the Mexican  agricultural  economy  became  more market-oriented,  policy
makers realized  that the full benefits  of the economic  liberalization  could  only come  with
secure and tradable  water rights  that offered  the flexibility of water use to respond  to changing
prices and demands.  Accordingly,  under the 1992 water law, and its 1994  regulations,  users
may convert  their existing  precarious  water rights to more secure tradable "concessions"  with
a maturity  of five to fifty years, with the norm being thirty years to ensure security  of the
water right. However,  the rights  are not as secure as in Chile. Under the Mexican
Constitution,  all water belongs  to the Nation  and this property right is perpetual  and  non-
transferable.  The law also mentions  the possibility  of forfeiture for reasons  of public  interest  if
the water has not been  used "efficiently;"  or if it has not been exploited  for three  years.
Although  the rights are specified  in volumetric  terms, in practice the rights  are proportional
since the water user associations  are to allocate  deficits or surpluses  proportionately  across  all
existing  rights. The rights  for both ground  and surface  water are recorded  in a public  registry.9
26.  By the end of 1995,  the National  Water Commission  had processed  water  rights
applications  accounting  for about  85 percent of volumetric  water rights. During  1995,  there
was widespread  leasing  and selling  of both surface and ground  water rights  in Mexico's  water-
scarce  regions.  Even prior to 1994, water trades were common.  However,  they  were limited
largely  to informal  sales of water for a year or season,  typically  between  neighbors.  Since  such
trades were illegal,  albeit  tolerated  by public authorities,  permanent  sales of water  rights  were
rare and little consideration  was given to third-party  water rights being  affected  by such trades.
The new law has facilitated  such leasing  and allowed  permanent  sales of water  rights  with
better protection  for aquifer  recharge  and third party rights. Most of the recent  water  sales
would  either not have been  undertaken  under the previous  regime,  thereby inhibiting  private
investment,  or would  have occurred  surreptitiously,  thereby  depleting  aquifers.  The bulk of
recent  water trades involve  farmers selling  to industrial  users, water companies  or more
efficient  farmers, thereby  encouraging  investment  in more productive  activities.  It has also
allowed  unprofitable  farmers  to reduce  their farming  debts  and to work as laborers  on more
efficient  farms  or to seek alternative  employment.
27.  Peru. The motivation  for Peru's water reform came with the realization  that existing
water legislation  and policies, which had caused serious problems, were poorly suited  for a
future of tighter fiscal constraints  and weakened  public institutions. By 1992, following
several years of virtually no public spending for maintenance  or rehabilitation  of public
irrigation  structures, many irrigation systems faced a high risk of failure. Water  delivery
became more irregular, quality  deteriorated and water conflicts grew. There was also
widespread  water theft. Even in areas where water was scarce, it continued  to be used
wastefully.  Thus, while water was rationed in Lima, the water company  incurred  high water
losses, and farmers  just outside  Lima continued to grow low-value, water-intensive  crops. In
addition, the threat of having  the State expropriate water rights for higher priority uses
discouraged  many worthwhile  investments  that required assured supplies  of water.
28.  To address these problems,  the Ministry of Agriculture  proposed  a new water law
modeled  along the lines of the 1981 Chilean water code. Under the proposed  Peruvian  law,
existing water users are to be given rights to water without charge. Rights  to new or
unallocated  surface  water are to be distributed via public auction. The rights may  be traded
at freely negotiated  prices provided that the trade would not reduce water availability  to
others and that there is enough water to maintain a minimnum  ecological  flow and to maintain
the accustomed  quality of life in cities and towns. Rights may also be mortgaged  or leased.
The law prohibits altering water quality to the detriment  of flora or fauna; however,  rather
than proposing specific  sanctions  and fines, it defers to the Environmental  Code  and
Environmental  Authority  to set and enforce water quality standards. (World  Bank  1995.)
29.  Under the draft law, water rights are to be acquired  by being recorded  in a public
Water Rights  Registry, specifying,  inter alia, the flow or volume (which  may be specified  in
terms of percentage  of stream flow or in shifts); the point at which the water will be
diverted; whether  it is for consumptive  or non-consumptive  use and whether  it is for
permanent  or temporary  use; the point and form in which the water will be returned  to the10
river system; and the amount  paid for the rights. The law also establishes  a property  tax on
water rights. In contrast  to the current law, the new rights do not have  to be used for any
specific  purpose, there are no priorities among water rights for different  purposes,  and the
water right is separate  from the land right for both surface and ground water.
30.  Passage of this law  has been delayed partly because of Congressional  concerns  on
how the initial allocation  would  be conducted. The delay also stemmed  from insufficient
involvement  of users in the design  of the proposed law and from opposition  from the few
that benefit from maintaining  the status quo.
31.  The western United  States. Because of the shortage of water in the western  United
States, a system of property  rights  to water based on the prior appropriation  doctrine
evolved: those that first diverted  and established beneficial use of the water obtained  primary
rights to it. Successive  claimants  could only obtain rights that were contingent  on those with
prior rights having  received  their allocations.
32.  Although  water rights  regimes  vary widely between states, their common  characteristic
is that the uses to which  water  is put canmot  be changed without  authorization  of state water
authorities. Only in the case  of one large project in Colorado  is relatively  unrestricted  trading
of water rights  permitted  (Box  3). Obtaining  authorization  to change  water  use is often  a
lengthy  and costly, requiring  consent  from the relevant governing  body after  public  hearings in
which people  who  could  be damaged  by the change in use can object.
33.  Perhaps the most extreme  example of restricting transfer between  uses occurs  in
California. The agricultural  sector makes up only 4 percent of the GDP of the state yet
receives about 44 percent of the water. Environmnental  use also is allotted  44 percent while
the urban and industrial  sector  receives  only 11 percent. In the agricultural  sector water
rights vary widely  from inherited  sources of cheap water to water that is highly  subsidized.
The anomalies  that these restrictions  cause are extreme; water is so inexpensive  to some
users (as low as $2.50 per acre-foot)  that rice is cultivated in the desert while  at the same
time some municipalities  have  built desalinization plants to supplement  their supplies  of
water at a cost of $2,000  per acre-foot.  Furthermore, incentives  to conserve  water  use are
perverse. In agriculture  many  farmers  are forced to operate under a "use it or lose it'  rule
while in urban use the rationing  that occurs during periods of drought  is based  on family use
during periods of plentiful  water  which  encourages  high water use when  there is no rationing.
34.  Clearly the system  requires  reform, yet the political complications  that any reform
brings are significant.  Assigning  to farmers the ability to simply  sell their rights  would  give
them millions  of dollars in windfall  gains on top of the large subsidies  that they  have already
received-an  unpopular  result  politically. Many the farmers fear that once  rights  become
transferable  they would  not be compensated  for what they would be giving  up. Such
problems illustrate  the deficiencies  of administrative  solutions to the allocation  of scarce
water resources. However,  the legislative  and administrative  considerations  in reforming
laws and procedures  allow  interested  parties great latitude to influence  how  the gains from11
Box 3.  Water Trading in Colorado's Big Thompson Project
A notable contrast  to the various restricted water right regimes  which  exist  in the western
United States  is provided  by the Big Thompson  scheme through which 310,000  acre  feet of
water have been supplied  annually  to users in the Northern Colorado  Water Conservancy
District. The scheme,  which  brings  water from the headwaters  of the Colorado  River  through  a
tunnel underneath  the Rocky  Mountains  to northeastern Colorado,  was partially  paid  for by
subscribers  in the water  district  in return  for the right to use the water. Soon  after  the  scheme
became fully operational,  it became  apparent that water demand  varied significantly  between
users and areas  within  the district.  The Northern Colorado  Water Conservancy  therefore
established  a system that allowed  water  rights to be traded on a permanent  basis  with the  only
requirements  being "beneficial  use", no sales outside the District  and that users  abide  by the
rules of the Conservancy.  A central  registry  records ownership  and ownership  transfers.  The
system has become  so refined  that a simple  postcard is used to notify  the Conservancy  of a
transfer.  An important  reason  for the smooth functioning  of this market is that from the inception
of this project water  users retain  rights to any return flows. Therefore  while  downstream  users
get the benefit of return  flows  from water  users upstream,  they have  no rights to them and
upstreamn  users are free to transfer  their rights without the need to compensate  downstream  users
for their loss of water.
An extremely  sophisticated  market has evolved for this water.  Many different  types  of
contracts  are used, from straight  transfers  to the purchase  and sale of options  to water.  Within  the
Conservancy  District  all of the complex  infrastructure  is in private  hands. The  Conservancy's
role is to record transactions  and to check that there is no cheating  by those taking  off water.  The
system  appears  to be operating  efficiently  and although there is undoubtedly  an economic  cost to
owners of water  rights not being  able to sell their water outside  the District,  within  it water
appears  to be used  at its highest  value.
reform are distributed.  In addition, the very large  number of people affected by any reform
make it costly and difficult to reach a solution that is agreeable to most parties. The
California case shows that even when institutions are relatively  well developed,
administrative solutions to apportioning scarce water among different groups can lead to
anomalies that defy logic and waste resources.
Advantages of Water Markets
35.  Tradable water rights allow the price of water to reflect the value of its alternative
uses, which creates incentives to put it to the most productive use. For example, if farmers
were able to sell their water rights at freely negotiated prices,  some might sell surplus water
to a neighboring city where it has a higher value.  Often they can generate a surplus by using
more efficient irrigation techniques or by switching to less water-intensive crops. In
addition, buyers of water rights are likely to conserve water more efficiently. Most new fruit
farmers in Chile use water-saving irrigation technologies and when Chile's main water
company, EMOS, realized that it could no longer obtain water rights without charge, it
invested in a program to significantly reduce physical water losses.12
36.  Chile's  transfer of water to more productive  uses was carried out voluntarily and
without having to raise water charges (Box 4).  In fact, water charges fell following the
introduction of tradable water rights.  The fall occurred because this regime facilitated the
transfer to user groups of the responsibility  for carrying out operations and maintenance
(O&M) activities and for setting water tariffs and because users were able to carry out O&M
activities at a much lower cost than the Government.  Despite the lower water charges, the
opportunity to sell water ensures that scarce water will not be used wastefully.
37.  Tradable water rights can help shift water to higher value uses in a way that is cheaper
than other alternatives that may include building expensive new hydraulic infrastructure,
confiscating water from farmers, or raising water charges substantially  to force farmers to
conserve water. Although the conveyance infrastructure to transfer traded water must be built
if it does not exist already, the cost of building may be less than that of generating new water
rights. For many years, the city of La Serena in Chile was able to meet its rapidly growing
demand for water by purchasing water rights from farmers at a lower cost than contributing to
the construction of a dam. Farmers received an acceptable price for their water and were
induced to use more efficient irrigation techniques.  A recent study evaluating the Chilean
water market experience finds that the net gains from the trading of water rights in the Elqui
Valley were about $1,000/share, roughly equal to the price of these water rights (Hearne and
Easter 1995). In the Limari Valley, the gains from trading shares in the Cogoti Reservoir were
estimated to be three times the recent transaction prices of $3,000/share-thus  even after the
cost of water transfer, water was worth three times more in one use than its next best
alternative. Without markets, it would have been difficult to effect this transfer.
38.  Secure water rights are particularly beneficial for smaller farmers, who have been most
vulnerable to reductions in their water allocation over time and who have few other sources of
collateral. Tradable water rights, by empowering  existing users, help reduce the abuses of
administrative allocation and give assurance to poor farmers that their water availability will
not be reduced. And because of their divisibility,  water lights give farmers the possibility
of mortgaging only part of their rights  for small loans,  rather than their entire holdings.
Box 4. What  is the Price of Water?
Many  confuse  the  water  charge  with the price of water  rights.  Under  a tradable  water  rights
regime,  the water  charge  should  equal  the O&M cost of the infrastructure,  whereas  the price  of
water  rights  would  be the  market  price for the pernanent right  to use the water.  To use an analogy
from the condominium  market,  the water charge is equivalent  to the condominium  fee  whereas  the
price of water  rights  is analogous  to the sale price of the condominium.  Under  an administrative
water  rights regime,  economic  efficiency  requires  that the water  charge  should  equal  the
opportunity  cost  of the  water,  which  in our analogy, would  correspond  to the market  rental  price  of
the condominium-usually  several  multiples  of the condominium  fee.  Whereas  this price  is
difficult  to set and enforce  administratively,  the sale or lease  price  under  a tradable  water  rights
system  automatically  reflects  the  opportunity  cost of water.13
Water conservation  may  also help control soil salinization,  which is caused  primarily  by
overwatering.
39.  It is interesting  that Chile's sustained annual growth of 6 percent in agriculture
during the 1980s  occurred  although  there were no public investments  in new hydraulic
infrastructure  from 1975  to 1990. While this was due in part to heavy  investment  in water
infrastructure  in previous  decades,  the tradable water rights regime  facilitated  the growth for
new uses of water and contributed  to the rapid expansion of fruit production.  Secure  and
tradable water rights  assure  investors that their rights will not subordinated  to those of other
users during times of shortage  and that, in fact, they will be able to buy water  from those
with a less valuable  use for it.
40.  Chile has also been  successful  in increasing access of the poor to potable  water.
Ninety-nine  percent  of Chile's  urban residents and 94 percent of its rural residents  enjoy
access to potable  water, typically  for 24 hours a day. This contrasts  sharply  with comparable
rates of coverage  of 63 percent  and 27 percent in 1970  in Chile and with developing  countries
elsewhere  in the world (Rosegrant  and Gazmuri 1994a).  While  this was due  to several  factors
such as ensuring  that  regulated  water tariffs reflect the true cost of water, allowing  competition
among  water companies  (Santiago  alone has seven private  companies),  and  subsidizing  water
consumption  for those  with  low incomes, the ability of water companies  to buy water from
farmers played  a significant  role.
41.  Secure  water rights  give  potential  investors in new hydraulic  projects  the confidence
that, once they  obtain  the rights  to the water generated  by their investment  (e.g. storage
reservoirs  and conveyance  infrastructure),  they will be theirs  to keep  or sell to others (farmers,
industry, hydropower  and  water  companies). Therefore ongoing  state  owned  projects,  such as
in Peru, could  be privatized  by selling  the hydraulic infrastructure  and unallocated  water and
land rights associated  with  the project, with the condition  that buyers  respect  existing  land and
water rights. A comprehensive  regulatory  framework, as is prepared  for the sale for public
utilities, would  assist  in such  a privatization.
When and How to Establish  Tradable Water Rights
Dificulties  in Establishing Water  Markets
42.  Despite the promise  that water markets hold, few countries  have  established  them
formally. The economic  argument  against tradable water rights rests on the perception  of
market failure which  arise  because:
*  There are high  transactions  costs from setting up a new  legal,  regulatory  and
institutional  framework,  from defining, measuring,  and enforcing  water  rights, from14
identifying  potential  beneficial  trades, and from making necessary  changes  in water
intakes  and conveyance  infrastructure  to effect  the transfers.
•  Capital  requirements  may  be high and time horizons  long so that natural  monopolies
are created  which  require  regulation.
*  There are issues of aquifer  depletion  and return  flows.
*  There are public  goods  aspects of flood  control, pollution  control  and disease
control  along water  courses  which may  justify government  intervention.
*  There are national  security  and humanitarian  aspects  of many water  resources  which
may  justify control  by government.
*  Using water  markets  may  exclude  the poor from access to water.
Comparing Water Market and Administrative Solutions
43.  For the reasons  mentioned  above, an effective  market for water will require
regulation  and be more difficult  to establish  than say a market for land. However,  the same
characteristics  of water make it difficult  to allocate  water under alternative  regimes.  Even
under administrative  systems  of water allocation,  the rights have to be defined  in a way  that
can be measured  and the resulting  allocation  of water rights  still needs  to be enforced.  The
conveyance  infrastructure  required  to effect transfers  in line with priorities  has to be built
regardless  of whether  the priorities  are determined  by the market or by legal and administra-
tive means (see Rosegrant  and Binswanger  1994). Similarly,  the same  environmental  laws  and
institutions  needed  to enforce  environmental  quality  under an administered  regime  can operate
under a tradable  water rights  regime.  The conflicts  between  consumptive  and  non-consumptive
rights and concerns  of monopolistic  pricing exist under either system. Similarly,  public  goods
aspects  and issues  of access  of the poor to water exist in both regimes.  For the  bulk of the
issues  then, the question  becomes  which of the two approaches-tradable property  rights  or an
administered  regime-is likely  to yield better outcomes.
44.  There are reasons to believe  that a water market will function better than
administered  allocation  in water-scarce  countries. Because a market system  increases  the
value of water, there are greater incentives  for defining water rights clearly, for improving
their measurement  and enforcement,  and for establishing  mechanisms  to resolve  disputes.
Similarly, the transactions  cost of identifying  potential gains from transferring  water  will be
lower if borne by beneficiaries  than by public authorities. The conveyance  infrastructure  that
must be built to effect the transfer will probably be built more cost-effectively  by the private
sector. Water user associations  and river basin councils, which must play an important  role
under either system, have a greater incentive to become  stronger and better organized  when
water rights are well-defined  and transferable.
45.  Equity concerns are often raised within the context of tradable water rights.
However, the enormous  inequities  from administrative  allocation of water suffered  by the
poor have been well documented.  The poorer sections  of cities frequently  resort to
expensive  water from tanker  trucks while the rich sections have piped water provided  below
cost. Similarly,  poor farmers  are more vulnerable  to reductions in their water rights  without15
compensation  under administrative  regimes. Allowing rights to be traded increases  the value
of the right and its transfer to more productive purposes increases  employment  possibilities.
As a result, the humanitarian  and equity aspects of water allocation  are likely  to be better
under a market regime. In this regard, Chilean policies  which subsidize  water charges  and
sewage connections  for the poorest sections of the community  appear  to have  dealt with
potential  inequities  more effectively  than those countries  where water is allocated
administratively.
46.  An argument  against  tradable  water rights is that institutional  mechanisms  for policing
water rights  markets  and ensuring that monopoly rents are not being earned are weak.
However, this argument  applies a fortiori to administrative  solutions.  If institutions  are not
capable of ensuring  a reasonably  functioning market in water rights, it is hard to imagine
how they could implement  fair and equitable water administration,  particularly  given the
political  pressures  to which such administrators are subject.
47.  Another  argument  against the establishment  of tradable water rights rests on the
externalities  that exist in the use of water such as those related  to return flows or the
environment  and those resulting  from flood control. Tradable water rights could indeed
exacerbate  these. Therefore,  if these are substantial, the efficiency  gains  from trading rights
might be minimal or trades may have to be disallowed. At issue here is the degree  to which
externalities  exist in water markets versus the degree to which improper  pricing and
allocation  decisions  under administrative  regimes result in the wrong incentives  and in
misallocation.  In many cases, tradable water rights internalize  externalities  that  arise from
water being wrongly  priced. The California experience illustrates  just how badly
administrative  decisions  can distort incentives.
48.  Although  a tradable  water rights regimne  is a promising  alternative  to administered
allocation regimes,  there are upfront costs to establishing  the new legal, regulatory,  and
institutional  framework.  The net benefits from water trading and from having  more secure
water rights must be larger than the transactions cost, which includes  the initial legal,
regulatory  and institutional  costs of establishing the regime, the costs of identifying  potential
gains from trade and any negative  externalities, and the cost of implementing  the transfers.
The political  and culturally viability  of individual  property rights to water and the
institutional  capacity  to establish  the legal and regulatory  framework  to monitor and enforce
water rights are important  issues that need to be addressed.
Issues of Transition
49.  While the design  and implementation  of tradable  water rights needs  to be tailored to
specific  country  circumstances,  the following general guidelines  may be useful  in the
transition.
50.  First, it is important  to build support for the passage  of legislation  establishing
tradable property rights in water. It may be useful to prepare, with appropriate16
modifications,  a draft water law based  on the experience of other countries.  A vigorous
information  campaign  and debate  can then help ensure that the final design  and
implementation  of the legal framework  is done in a transparent and participatory  manner.
Explaining  draft versions  of the law with a willingness to accommodate  reaction  is critical to
success. Farmers and other  water users have to be made aware that their concerns  and
objections  have been considered  and dealt with. The process can also help  identify  and
mobilize  groups that stand to benefit  the most from the proposed legislation.
51.  Second,  there is a need  to establish  effective institutions  to draft the regulations  and
to implement  the law efficiently  and fairly. This requires ensuring  that the water  user
associations  and public institutions,  such as water registries, water councils  and watershed
authorities, are able to carry out their responsibilities and that sufficient  budgetary  resources
are devoted for their effective  functioning.  It may be useful to contract  for technical
assistance to draft the regulations  and to strengthen water user associations  at this stage. In
addition, it is important  to ensure  that staff of the public institutions  are capable,  that they
fully understand  and support  the new legislation, and that they are perceived  to be honest
and unbiased. Given the role of public institutions in the initial allocation  of water rights and
in the subsequent  operation  of the water market, poorly trained or corrupt  employees  could
prevent the market for water rights from ever developing or functioning  effectively.
52.  There are several  issues  related  to the initial allocation of tradable  water  rights. For
existing users, it is suggested  that water rights be granted without charge  in recognition  of
the fact that some farmers  have  already paid for their rights implicitly  in the purchase  price
of their land and that the government  is unlikely to recover the capital  costs  of its investment
in infrastructure. For new and unallocated  water rights, it is important  that  they  be sold via
auctions carried out in an open and transparent manner and that a minimum  reservation  price
be established  prior to the auction.  Information on prices and volumes  should  be made
publicly  available, and minimal  costs charged to enter the auction. In particular,  care needs
to be taken that the poor are well-informed  regarding the need to register  their rights and the
procedures for doing so. The advantages  that the poor can enjoy from secure  property rights
can only come if they receive  the rights to begin with. In addition to water  user associations,
the public media  needs to be extensively  used to ensure water rights registration.  There is
also a need to clarify that where  there are large quantities of non-consumptive  rights
(hydropower,  for example),  they  do not prejudice consumptive  rights. This may  require
specifying  the volumes  that will be released each month of the year (based  on historic  use of
consumptive  rights holders)  and ensuring  that any consumptive  rights  between  the intake and
discharge points are respected.
53.  Where functioning  water user associations exist, the actual allocation  should  be a
two-step process: water rights should  be first assigned to the water user associations  based
on past usage and then assigned  to the individual users by the associations  according  to
guidelines  issued by a Water  Council.  The titles to water are registered  only at the
individual level and not at the user association  level. The two-step  method  has two
advantages  over direct assignment  to individuals. First, it is easier for the water  user17
association  rather than the Governrment  to verify past water usage of individual  farmers.
Second, it leads to titling many  users simultaneously.  This "block titling"  of water  rights
reduces unit titling costs and helps  resolve conflicts. It is also important  to ensure  that
elections for the officials  of the water user associations  are conducted  in a transparent  and
fair manner so that if members  of the association are dissatisfied  with the way it is being
run, then can remove  the officials  that are not performing satisfactorily.  While  this will not
eliminate  unjust allocations  or corruption, it will help reduce it and is still likely  to more  just
and less corrupt than when unelected  government officials are making  decisions  on water
allocation and pricing.
54.  For the second  step of the initial allocation process, the guidelines  may  vary by
region, watershed, and canal. Where there already exist registered water rights  and where
there is sufficient  water to honor all water rights, it is probably sufficient  to have  them re-
registered in the new public  registry of water rights. However, where the existing  registry
contains many overlapping  property rights (the sum of water rights exceeds  the water
available), it would be better for the initial allocation to be based on past usage  estimated  by
water user associations.  In situations  where there have existed gross abuses  of water rights,
it is probably best to assign  them to communities  based on historic use and subsequently
proportionally  to individuals  based on irrigated land area.
Design Issues
55.  The potential  of water trades to infringe upon the rights or water availability  of third-
parties needs to be well understood  and addressed. This is most likely to occur for
agricultural "return flows." If a farmer were free to sell his entire irrigation  water  to users
outside the area, users downstream  that may have received the farmer's return  flows would
lose their water without  compensation  (Figure 1). One way to address  the return flow
problem is by having  the water  user association  and/or a public body such  as a watershed
authority approve requests  for changes  of water intake to ensure that third  party rights are
not affected. Since virtually  all sales of water outside the area will require a modification  in
water intake, this should  in principle  protect against water sales that reduce  the water
available to third parties. However,  the way that this rule is enforced  could  either penalize
downstream  farmers or stifle the market. Some alternate ways for formulating  the
regulations  to address  this issue  are discussed  below.
56.  One option is to adopt the Chile approach where all permanent  consumptive  use
rights are expressed as a percentage  share of water availability  (either  in a stream  or
reservoir), with the shares  summing  to 100  percent. If, because of the return flow effect, a
sale of water rights results  in reduced water availability, all consumptive  rights  holders,
including  the entity buying the water, would share in the reduced flow (Figure  2). The
system works fairly well in Chile, where few irrigation systems have significant  return
flows. In the case of two Chilean  rivers with high return flows, the Elqui and Aconcagua,
their respective  water user organizations  have prohibited upstream  users from selling  their
water to users whose return flows would not flow back into the river. In countries  which18
Figure 1. Return  Flow  Problem  When Upstream  Farmers  Can Sell 100%  of Volumetric  Rights
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have significant  flows,  the Chilean  system could restrict trades  in too many  rivers  or reduce the
amount of water  available  to downstream  users. Thus other options  may  be preferable.
57.  An alternative  formulation  would be to specify  that all water rights  have  both a
consumptive  and non-consumptive  portion. The consumptive  portion  could  be sold without
restriction. The non-consumptive  part could be sold if it did not deprive  others of water.
Thus, where there are no return flow issues (most transfers within  the same  water basin for
the same use), owners  would  be free to sell 100 percent of their water rights. Because  of
difficulties in calculating  the purely consumptive portion of the water on a case-by-case
basis, this approach,  which  is the similar to that used in California,  may not be appropriate
for developing  countries.  However, it may be suitable to calculate  and publish  averages  for
pure consumptive  use as a basis for the trade. These averages  could specify  the volume of
water consumed  by a certain  crop or activity, with owners  being free to sell only this
amount. This would  reduce  the need for each seller to justify the consumptive  portion of the
water while giving sufficient  protection to downstream users (Figure 3). This system  would
work equally well for surface  and ground water.
58.  It may be desirable  to introduce a tax on the holdings  of property rights for water
whose rate is determined  solely  on the holdings of water rights and not by the purpose for
which the water is used or for the quantity of water actually used. In this way, the tax has
some desirable  properties  sirmilar  to those for land taxes: it does not distort  production
decisions  and it helps  recover  public investment costs in infrastructure.  For equity  and
administrative  ease, the regulations  could exempt farmers and other users that  hold small
quantities  of water rights.
59.  To reduce  conflicts  between consumptive and non-consumptive  water  rights, the tax
should also be applied  to non-consumptive  rights, although  the tax rate could be lower.
Similarly  the tax on contingent  water rights could be at a different  (lower)  rate, or be based
on the amount  of water  actually  made available. The proceeds of the tax could  be used both
to finance watershed  activities  of a public goods or externalities  nature. The introduction  of
the tax on water holdings  should  coincide with the removal  of the existing  tax supplement  on
irrigated land so that irrigated  land is not double-taxed. There is also a good case for a
lump-sum  "exit" water  tariff that would be paid to the original  water user association  so as
not to burden the remaining  water users if a member were to sell his or her rights outside
the association. 2
60.  There are two areas  where monopolies of water rights could  develop;  in privatizing
large hydraulic projects  and in the sale of non-consumptive  water rights. To deal with the
first problem, it is crucial  that an appropriate regulatory framework  be developed  prior to
2.  This would be based on the discounted value of a stream of estimated future water tariffs. Some Mexican
water user associations obliae buyers to pay a percentage  of the water tariff to the original association.20
privatization.  This should  be done in the context of each scheme, in a similar manner  to
those developed  for the sale of other former public monopolies.  In the latter  case, the tax on
non-consumptive  water rights and minimum  reservation  prices at auctions, accompanied
with regulations  determining  power tariffs, should help avoid monopolies.
61.  Environmental  safeguards  may also be needed. For most enviromnental  issues  such
as those  relating to water quality,  there is no need to change standards simply  because  water
trades are now allowed.  If water quality laws need tightening, it is best done independently
of the laws establishing  tradable  water rights. However, it is important  to ensure  that
minimum  flow requirements  exist in areas where water sales could lead to desertification,
habitat could be damaged, or recreational  activities threatened.
62.  In areas where the extensive  use of groundwater  pumping may lower the water table
(as in parts of Chile), it is important  that ground water rights and use be recorded  and
subject to regulation. Under most administered  systems of water allocation,  owners  of the
land above an aquifer have  full rights to its water, even if their use were to result in
depletion  of the aquifer  and even if its extraction infringes upon surface  water rights. Under
the Chilean  law, there is better protection  against aquifer depletion  by relying  more on users
themselves  to monitor extraction. To register ground water rights, the Chilean  law requires
owners to belong to a ground water users commission  that helps monitor extraction.  If the
exploitation  of ground water by a user causes detriment to others who are legally  entitled  to
the water, Chile's General Directorate  of Water, at the request of one or more of the
affected  parties, may establish  temporary  and proportional reductions in volumetric  rights
and bar new exploitation.  The law also establishes an area of protection in which  the
installation  of similar works (e.g. pumps) is banned.
Conclusion
63.  This paper argues  that as compared  to administrative  methods  of water  allocation,
secure and well-defined  tradable  property rights to water in water-scarce  regions  are likeiy  to
improve water  use. The experience  with administrative  water management  systems  has not
been impressive.  Water is used wastefully,  public hydraulic  projects are poorly conceived,
implemented  and operated,  and the systems  have failed  to protect the environment  or make
water accessible  to the poor. As urbanization  increases  and pressures  on water  supplies  and
government  budgets  grow, solutions  based on such approaches  are likely  to become  more
difficult. In principle,  and reflecting  the Chilean  experience  in water-scarce  areas,  tradable
rights can benefit  the poor and increase  user participation  in water allocation  and  investment
decisions.  They can allow  rapid and voluntary  changes  in water allocation  in response  to
changing  water  demands  and stimulate  investment  and employment  as investors  are assured  of
their access to water. In addition,  the economic  efficiency  of agricultural  production  will  be
enhanced  as output will reflect  the true scarcity  of water rather than the frequently  distorted
prices set by administrators  subject  to political  lobbying.21
64.  However,  water markets  are not a panacea. And  because  of water's unique
characteristics,  an effective  tradable water rights system  is not easy to introduce.  There are
high transactions  costs. In addition, an unregulated  water market also could  lead to
environmental  problems  and monopolies.  It could also result in under-investment  in activities
that may be socially  but not privately  profitable. However,  these same characteristics  make
administrative  solutions  to water allocation  difficult. As shown  by the experience  of Chile,
water markets  rarely make  them worse. The challenge  is to decide  when water  markets  are a
better alternative  and  to enact  legislation  to establish  them. The design  and implementation  of
the legislation  should  involve  all those that have a stake in how water is used. It should  also
pay particular  attention  to the initial allocation  of water rights, to the creation  and maintenance
of a water rights  registry,  and to ensuring that the rights  of third parties are respected.  As with
any system,  public  authorities  will also need to design  and enforce  environmental  laws and to
subsidize  those  high-return  activities  where the benefits  accrue  to persons  that  are not sharing
in their costs.
65.  One striking  aspect  of the debate on water markets  versus administrative  methods  of
water allocation  is the lack of empirical  evidence  regarding  many of the key issues. This is not
surprising  since  transactions  costs and institutional  considerations  are notoriously  hard to
quantify.  Nevertheless,  in a debate of such importance  the absence  of data is hampering
reasoned  discussion.  Some  efforts are underway to remedy  this problem  but much  more needs
to be done. 3 Further investigation  of water markets that are currently  working  is required  as
well  more work on the inadequacies  and shortcomings  of administered  solutions  to problems  of
water scarcity.  Given  the widespread  perception  of failure  of governments  in developing
countries  to solve  problems  of scarcity  by administrative  fiat, many people  feel that the burden
of proof on the superiority  of an admninistered  approach  is on its advocates.  Additional
evidence  will allow  the alternatives  to be compared and evaluated  more objectively.
3.  While  some  studies  such as Hearne  and Ester (1995) have attempted  to measure  the gains from  water  trades,
such studies  have  not attempted  to compare  the institutional  and investment  aspects  of market-based  versus
administered  solutions.22
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